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What is the status of research on implicit bias?  In light of meta-analyses revealing ostensibly low 
average correlations between implicit measures and behavior, as well as various other psychometric 
concerns, criticism has become ubiquitous.   We argue that while there are significant challenges and 
ample room for improvement, research on the causes, psychological properties, and behavioral effects 
of implicit bias continues to deserve a role in the sciences of the mind as well as in efforts to 




What is the status of research on implicit bias?  Criticism is ubiquitous.   Recent meta-analytic 
reviews suggest that the Implicit Association Test is a ‘poor’ predictor of behavior (Oswald et al. 2013) 
and that changes in scores on implicit measures may not be associated with changes in behavior 
(Forscher, Lai, et al., 2019).  Prominent philosophers have questioned the validity of research on 
implicit social cognition altogether (e.g., Buckwalter 2018; Hermanson 2017a,b, 2018; Machery 2016, 
2017a,b; Yao & Reis-Dennis ms).  Edouard Machery (2017b), for example, describes an ongoing 
“rescue mission” within the field, implying that the relevant research is in peril of being discredited.  
Machery argues that leading methods for studying and theorizing about implicit bias need to be 
rethought from the ground up, writing that we should not ‘build theoretical castles on such 
quicksand.’1  Headlines in the popular press have been even more pointed.  New York Magazine reports, 
‘Psychology’s Favorite Tool for Measuring Racism Isn’t Up to the Job’ (Singal 2017); the Chronicle of 
Higher Education asks, ‘Can We Really Measure Implicit Bias? Maybe Not’ (Bartlett 2017); and most 
pointedly, the Wall Street Journal describes ‘The False “Science” of Implicit Bias’ (Mac Donald 2017).    
We argue that while there are significant challenges and ample room for improvement, 
research on the causes, psychological properties, and behavioral effects of implicit bias continues to 
deserve a role in the sciences of the mind as well as in efforts to understand, and ultimately combat, 
discrimination and inequality.  In what follows, we first describe the central issues that have been 
described as crises, anomalies, or puzzles for the field (§2).  To demonstrate that these alleged 
anomalies are empirical questions on which progress is steadily being made, we place them in the 
broader historical context of theorizing on the relationship between attitudes and behavior (§§3-4).  
We respond to potential criticism (§5), and then, finally, point to directions for future research (§6).  
Along the way, we highlight the importance of these issues for fundamental questions about the 
architecture of the mind and the metaphysics of action, especially how mental states, attitudes, and 
dispositions interact with contextual factors to produce behavior. Specifically, we aim to make 
progress toward a person-by-situation interactionist theory of the mind and action, which requires 
rethinking the premises underlying enduring philosophical debates about the importance of personal 
variables (such as beliefs, traits, or even virtues) and situational opportunities and constraints 
(including social and environmental factors).   
A quick note: our focus is on the psychology of implicit bias and the psychometric properties 
of implicit measures.  Philosophers, legal theorists, activists, and other social scientists have raised a 
number of important critical questions about research on implicit bias that we do not address directly 
here.  Perhaps the most well-known of these is that research on implicit bias obscures the ‘structural’ 
causes of inequality and discrimination (e.g., Banks and Ford 2008; Dixon et al. 2012; Haslanger 2015).  
We have addressed some of these issues elsewhere (Madva 2016b, 2017; Brownstein forthcoming) 
and will note links between the issues presented here and these broader concerns where possible.     
 
2. Central Criticisms 
Current criticism is rooted in two sets of findings.2  The first concerns the extent to which 
implicit measures predict behavior.  The second concerns the stability of individuals’ scores on implicit 
measures over time. 
 
2.1 Predicting Behavior 
Estimates of average correlations between individuals’ scores on implicit measures and measures of 
behavior have varied, from approximately r = .14 to r = .28 (Cameron et al. 2012; Greenwald et al. 
2009a; Oswald et al. 2013).  This variety is due to a number of factors, including the type of measures, 
type of attitudes measured (e.g., attitudes in general vs. intergroup attitudes in particular), inclusion 
criteria for meta-analyses, and statistical meta-analytic techniques.  We discuss some of the 
ramifications of these differences below.  Nevertheless, according to standard conventions, all of these 
correlations are considered small to small-to-medium.  Kurdi and Banaji (2017) report that these 
correlations mean that individual differences in implicit bias account for between 1% and 8% of 
variance in intergroup discrimination.  From these data, critics have concluded that implicit measures, 
in particular, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al. 1998), are ‘poor’ predictors of 
behavior.3  Oswald and colleagues conclude that ‘the IAT provides little insight into who will 
discriminate against whom, and provides no more insight than explicit measures of bias’ (2013, 18).  
Many have taken Oswald and colleagues’ conclusion to be definitive (especially many critics outside 
psychology; e.g., Bartlett 2017; Singal 2017; Yao & Reis-Dennis ms). 
 2.2 Temporal Instability 
Individuals’ scores on implicit measures fluctuate considerably over time.  Multiple longitudinal studies 
have demonstrated low correlations between individuals’ scores on implicit measures across days, 
weeks, and months (Cooley & Payne 2017; Cunningham et al. 2001; Devine et al. 2012; Gawronski et 
al. 2017).  This instability—a reflection of ‘test-retest’ reliability—is particularly pronounced on 
implicit measures of racial attitudes.  Put simply, ceteris paribus, an individual’s score on an implicit 
measure at T1—particularly an implicit measure of racial attitudes—is a weak predictor of her score 
on that same measure at T2.  Moreover, scores on implicit measures appear to be more temporally 
unstable than individuals’ scores on corresponding explicit measures (Gawronski et al. 2017). 
 
3. Attitude-Behavior Relations 
In this section, we first provide a broader context for questions about using attitudes—
whether measured implicitly or explicitly, directly or indirectly—to predict behavior.  Then we apply 
these background points to the case of implicit bias. 
 
3.1 Background 
Predicting the future is difficult.  Scientists have achieved remarkable success in predicting outcomes 
in some domains, particularly with respect to highly controlled systems in the natural sciences (e.g., 
predicting the trajectories of celestial objects).  In other domains, even in the natural sciences, 
predictive success is less impressive (e.g., meteorology).  A crucial job for philosophers of science is 
to calibrate our expectations of the predictive abilities of scientific models to various kinds of 
phenomena.  For example, ceteris paribus, we should expect less predictive accuracy of more complex 
and less controlled systems than simpler ones.   
The following discussion is aimed at calibrating our expectations of implicit measures to the 
realities involved with predicting the behavior of individual human beings.  What should count as 
predictive success?  For context, compare the average correlations between individuals’ scores on 
implicit measures and measures of behavior (r = .14 to r = .28) to correlation coefficients between 
other constructs and behavior: beliefs and stereotypes about outgroups and behavior (r = .12; Talaska 
et al. 2008); IQ and income (r = .2-.3; Strenze 2007); SAT scores and freshman grades in college (r = 
.24; Wolfe and Johnson 1995); parents’ and their children’s socioeconomic status (r = .2-.3; Strenze 
2007).4  In general, it is rare for any well-known individual-difference variable to approach so-called 
‘large’ or ‘medium-to-large’ zero-order correlations (i.e., r ≥.4) with meaningful behaviors and 
outcomes.  Admittedly, a profound skeptic of psychological research, or a dyed-in-the-wool 
situationist, might simply conclude that all these individualistic measures are ‘poor.’5  In what follows, 
however, we will argue that there are independently plausible, theory- and data-driven grounds for 
expecting precisely these small positive average correlations between isolated psychological measures 
and behavior, when other important factors are ignored.  While there are some exceptions to this 
pattern (discussed below, in this section), expectations of predictive success should be modest.6  
Indeed, we would worry about a massive ‘file drawer’ problem for research on implicit bias if the 
reported correlations between implicit measures and behavior exceeded these comparative norms.7   
In a similar vein, it is crucial to recall that research on implicit measures partly arose out of the 
recognition that self-report (i.e., explicit) measures of attitudes predict behavior within this small to 
small-to-medium range as well, a predictive pattern that has been repeatedly confirmed in the more 
recent meta-analyses.  This range is, therefore, no less and no more ‘damning’ for self-report than for 
implicit measures.  Attitude researchers have not, nor should have, abandoned self-report measures, 
given these findings.  Our point here is not that self-report measures are perfect and that implicit 
measures are just as good as them.  Rather, our point is that while some proponents of implicit 
measures may have exaggerated their status as golden pipelines into the deep truth of individual’s 
minds, these meta-analyses of measure-behavior correlations confirm that implicit measures fall within 
the range of other familiar and useful psychological tests.  Self-report and implicit measures have 
distinctive strengths and weaknesses, which we discuss in the next section. 
Since the 1970s, attitude researchers have recognized that the key question is not whether self-
reported attitudes predict behavior just as such, but rather, when they predict behavior.  One important 
lesson is that attitudes better predict behavior when there is clear correspondence between the attitude 
object and the behavior in question (Ajzen & Fishbein 1977).  For example, while generic attitudes 
toward the environment do not predict recycling behavior very well, specific attitudes toward recycling 
do (Oskamp et al. 1991).8  In the 1970s and 1980s, a consensus emerged that attitude-behavior 
relations depend in general on the particular behavior being measured, the conditions under which 
the behavior is performed, and the person who is performing the behavior (e.g., Zanna & Fazio 1982).  
A wealth of theoretical models of attitude-behavior relations take these facts into account to make 
principled predictions about when attitudes do and do not predict behavior (e.g., Fazio 1990).  
Indeed, stepping back from issues in psychometrics, the thought that any specific attitude will 
predict a range of behavior, regardless of behavior-specific, context-specific, and person-specific 
variables, conflicts with basic long-understood truisms about the mind.  A person who likes hot dogs 
may be thought of as being disposed to eat hot dogs, but only when controlling for obvious variables.  
Does she believe that eating hot dogs is morally or religiously inappropriate? Is she dieting?  Full from 
a big meal?  Did she just floss?  Is it 7:30AM and simply an odd time to eat a hot dog? Are there other 
food options that she prefers nearby? Is she pretending to prefer escargot over hot dogs in order to 
impress a new acquaintance?  Liking hot dogs, just as such, does not predict eating hot dogs in every, 
or even in the preponderance, of situations; we should expect low ‘zero-order’ correlations here.  But 
concluding from this that self-reported liking of hot dogs is entirely useless for the prediction of hot 
dog-related behavior would be absurd.  Behavior prediction depends on assessing people’s attitudes 
in conjunction with their other attitudes and beliefs, their contexts, as well as with facts about the 
specific behavior in question.   
Even attitudes that strongly correspond with behavior are only reliably predictive under 
theoretically expected conditions.  Attitudes toward politicians, and toward political parties, tend to 
be relatively strongly associated with voting intentions and voting behavior, for example (for review, 
see Reyna et al., 2005).  But Fazio and Williams (1986) found that the length of time it took participants 
to respond on a rating scale to questions about then-presidential candidates Ronald Reagan and Walter 
Mondale moderated the relationship between their attitudes and their actual voting behavior.  Fazio 
and Williams characterized these response latencies as indicators of ‘attitude accessibility.’  For voters 
with highly accessible attitudes (i.e., those who responded quickly), 80% of the variance in their voting 
behavior was predicted by their attitudes toward Reagan and Mondale.  For voters with low attitude 
accessibility (i.e., those who responded slowly), only 44% of the variance in their voting behavior was 
predicted by their attitudes toward Reagan and Mondale.9  
When the behavior in question is socially sensitive, such as intergroup behavior involving racial 
attitudes, predicting it becomes even more difficult.  Intergroup behavior—such as hiring decisions, 
interactions between police and civilians, and doctors’ medical prescriptions—is inherently socially 
sensitive.  Moreover, these kinds of intergroup behaviors are ambiguous in an important respect.  In 
the sense that the attitude corresponding to eating hot dogs is liking hot dogs, what is the attitude 
corresponding to hiring more qualified men than qualified women for a job?  Preferring men to 
women is a very rough proxy for this, as are related associations between men and, say, intelligence or 
competence.  This ambiguity, along with the inherent difficulty of assessing people’s attitudes in 
situations where they are frequently motivated to hide them, must frame any expectations of the 
attitude-behavior relationship. 
 
3.2 Implicit Measures and Behavioral Prediction 
The core upshot of the discussion thus far is that, without taking person-, context-, and behavior-
specific moderators into account, a meta-analysis of any valid attitude measure ought to find 
consistent, positive, but low predictive relations between attitudes and behavior.  This is exactly what has 
been found in meta-analyses of implicit measures.  Not a single meta-analysis of implicit measures has reported 
nonsignificant correlations close to zero or negative correlations with behavior. 
Some critics interpret the idea of moderated predictive relations as a sign of failure, suggesting 
that such arguments are post-hoc attempts to save the field.  It is true that many studies in this area 
have ignored the basic, theory-driven considerations that we are emphasizing (Machery, p.c.).  But it 
is crucial to recognize that theories of key moderators and processes predate the current wave of 
criticism of implicit bias and have received little attention from critics.  The idea of moderated 
prediction by implicit measures is at the core of many highly cited theories, including the MODE 
model (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999), aversive racism theory (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004), the dual-
attitude model (Wilson et al. 2000), and the reflective-impulsive model (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
Moreover, the hypothesis of moderated prediction has been directly tested in the very first studies that 
used measures of implicit bias to predict behavior (i.e., Dovidio et al. 1997; Fazio et al. 1995). 
Expanding on extant theory and empirical findings, Friese and colleagues (2008) offered a systematic, 
detailed, theoretically guided review of when and why implicit measures do and do not predict 
behavior, identifying variables such as whether individuals were or were not motivated to control their 
spontaneous impulses, whether individuals were high or low in working memory capacity (and so were 
differentially able to control their impulses), and so on.   
For example, consistent with predictions derived from the MODE model (Fazio, 1990) and 
aversive racism theory (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), some of the first studies on the prediction of 
behavior with implicit measures found that implicit bias showed stronger relations with spontaneous 
compared to deliberate behavior, whereas explicit bias showed stronger relations with deliberate 
compared to spontaneous behavior (Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio et al., 1995). If the authors of these 
studies had focused on average correlations, they would have found positive, but relatively weak 
relations between implicit bias and behavior.  However, such average correlations would conceal the 
insight that predictive relations should be high only for certain types of behavior (i.e., spontaneous vs. 
deliberate behavior).10  
Some meta-analyses have done an exemplary job of coding for key moderators. For example, 
Cameron and colleagues (2012) analyzed 167 studies that used sequential priming measures to predict 
behavior.  They found a small average correlation between sequential priming scores and behavior (r 
= .28).   Yet, correlations were substantially higher under theoretically expected conditions (r = .4) 
and close to zero under conditions where no relation would be expected (r = -.004).  Cameron and 
colleagues identified their moderators from the fundaments of three influential dual-process models 
of social cognition.11  While these models differ in important ways, they converge in predicting that 
implicit measures will correspond more strongly with behavior when agents have low motivation or 
low opportunity to engage in deliberation, or when implicit associations and deliberatively considered 
propositions are consistent with each other.  It is important to emphasize that Cameron et al. did not 
simply take the stated expectations of the authors of the included studies for granted in coding 
moderators.  Rather, the dual-process moderators were derived a priori from the theoretical literature.   
A more recent meta-analysis of intergroup IAT studies focuses on both theoretical and design-
related factors that moderate relations between implicit measures and behavior.  Kurdi and colleagues 
(2018) find an average zero-order correspondence of r = .37 in studies using the most effective IAT 
designs.  Specifically, they find an average correspondence of r = .37 when they restrict their analysis 
to studies using a standard IAT rather than an IAT-variant, like the ‘Single-Category’ IAT (Karpinski 
& Steinman 2006), a relative and graded measure of behavior (e.g., deciding precisely how much 
money to donate to a black student organization relative to a predominantly white student 
organization, rather than simply deciding whether to donate some fixed sum to a black student 
organization or not), and that have high correspondence between the attitude and behavioral measures 
(in the same vein that we discussed above, viz. recycling attitudes and recycling behavior).  We discuss 
these findings, as well as potential ways to improve implicit measures, in §6.  The point here is that, as 
follows from Cameron and colleagues’ review, it is premature to conclude anything from average 
correlations between measures of attitudes and behaviors, which ignores any theoretical expectations 
of the relations between them. 
The same points are key when the incremental validity of implicit measures is taken into 
consideration.  That is, meta-analyses find that the IAT predicts behaviors over and above self-report 
measures (e.g., Kurdi et al. 2018).  This does not mean that the IAT is superior (or inferior) to self-
report measures.  Rather, it means that the IAT adds to the predictive power of self-report measures.  
Moreover, some specific studies that find no predictive power in self-report measures find significant 
predictive power in corresponding implicit measures (e.g., Agerström & Rooth 2011).  Kurdi and 
colleagues (2018) replicated this result using a modeling approach recommended by Westfall and 
Yarkoni (2016), showing that the incremental predictive validity of implicit and explicit measures is 
highly similar.  This statistical approach controls more effectively for self-reported attitudes as well as 
for measurement error.  What remains the key open question is when—in what domains, under what 
conditions, etc.—implicit measures outperform explicit measures and vice versa.  Each makes 
distinctive contributions to the prediction of behavior.  Moreover, the conditions under which one 
type of measure outperforms the other will most likely vary on theoretically expected grounds (e.g., 
when the topic is socially sensitive, when the motivation or opportunity to control spontaneous 
impulses is low, etc.).   
It is likely that the best predictions will be achieved by combining both types of measure.  For 
example, using a large dataset (N = 24,015), Bar-Anan and Vianello (2018) incorporated seven 
different implicit measures and three different explicit measures, on three distinct topics (race, politics, 
and the self), and found that a dual-construct model fit the data better than a single-construct model.12  
Indeed, even in the case of political attitudes, for which self-report measures are strongly predictive 
of political behavior, implicit measures have incremental validity.  Friese and colleagues (2007) found 
that both self-reported attitudes toward political parties in Germany and self-reported intentions to 
vote strongly predicted voting behavior.  Yet in both cases, a variant of the IAT—the single-target 
IAT—showed incremental predictive validity.  Greenwald and colleagues (2009b) report similar 
findings in the US context using both self-reported and implicit race attitude measures to predict 
voting decisions for John McCain and Barack Obama.  Both self-report and implicit measures predicted 
voting.  This is noteworthy given the electoral power of ‘undecided’ voters who fail to report clear 
political preferences (see Galdi et al. 2008). 
 
4. Temporal Stability 
When relevant theoretical and methodological variables (e.g., theory-based moderators) are ignored 
and averaged over, one should expect the relevant attitude-behavior correlations to be positive, but 
relatively small overall.  This expectation is borne out in the above meta-analyses.  This finding does 
not necessarily impugn the validity or utility of the constructs posited by theories of attitudes or 
implicit social cognition.   
Low test-retest stability in implicit measures represents a more serious challenge to their 
psychometric quality.13  But here, too, attention to various a priori and theoretically derived 
considerations is crucial.  In particular, the stability over time of a person’s scores on implicit measures 
must be understood in terms of the interaction of individual differences with situational variables.  
Philosophers and social scientists have long debated the relative importance, for explaining human 
thought and action, of features of individuals (e.g., beliefs, traits, and virtues) versus situational 
variables (e.g., wealth, culture, and modes of production).  Implicit bias presents a case study for the 
requirement of focusing on their complex, yet theoretically meaningful, ways of interacting. 
 
4.1 Background 
Some measures of individual-difference variables are more stable over time than others.  For example, 
measures of intelligence and personality tend to be much more stable than implicit measures.  From 
two to twelve weeks, for example, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (4th Edition), has test-retest 
reliability of .7-.9 (Wechsler 2014).  Estimates of test-retest reliability on implicit measures vary, as we 
will explain below, but they tend to be much lower (roughly from .3 to .55).  How should we 
understand measures that are malleable across time and situations?  Changes in scores across time on 
any measure that attempts to capture differences between individuals can be due to a number of 
different factors.  If a scale is being used to track changes over time in a person’s weight, a lower 
reading on second measurement could reflect that the person lost weight, is at a much higher elevation 
above sea level, or that the scale is broken.  The first possibility explains the change in terms of the 
person; the second explains the change in terms of context; the third in terms of a faulty instrument.  
The dominant interpretation within the field of intergroup psychology has been that the instability of 
implicit measures across time indicates changes within persons, namely, malleability within their 
implicit associations.  Some researchers, most notably Keith Payne and colleagues, have taken the 
second route, arguing that more attention ought to be paid to changes in situational factors.  Critics 
of implicit bias research have taken the third route, arguing that test-retest instability suggests that 
measures like the IAT are faulty instruments. 
 Although we agree with some prominent criticisms related to the low stability of implicit 
measures (e.g., low temporal stability of a measure can undermine its capability to predict behavior 
over time), it is important to distinguish between temporal stability of a measure and its validity in 
capturing a particular construct, given that the measured construct may be unstable over time. Based 
on these considerations, we are sympathetic to a combination of the first and second interpretations.  
However, these interpretations are not easy to disambiguate, because changes across time on implicit 
measures may reflect relatively short-term changes in the momentary accessibility of stored 
information, given some change in the agent’s situation, or longer-term changes in the structure or 
strength of a person’s associations themselves (Gawronski & Bodenhausen 2006; Madva 2016a; see 
§5 for discussion of Payne and colleagues’ ‘Bias of Crowds’ model).  In the next section, we focus on 
reasons to think that, when relevant contextual features are held constant, implicit measures can 
capture more stable trait-like features of individuals.  This conclusion gives reason to doubt the third 
interpretation, that instability in implicit measures across time shows these instruments to be faulty.  
But our point in the next section is not only that improvements in the design of implicit measures can 
lead to greater test-retest reliability.  Our point is also that measuring the transient thoughts and 
feelings that people have in specific contexts is itself valuable both for explanatory and normative 
reasons.  If tired people reliably show more bias on implicit measures than well-slept people, for 
example, then we will not only understand a feature of the dynamics of short-term changes in implicit 
bias, but also a potential element of mitigating bias (e.g., by instituting limits on the number of hours 
police officers can work in one stretch).    
   
4.2 Implicit Attitudes and Temporal Stability  
In a recent longitudinal study, Gawronski and colleagues found that implicit measures of self-concept, 
political attitudes, and racial attitudes were less temporally stable across 1-2 months than 
corresponding explicit measures.  It would, however, be premature to interpret such findings as 
evidence that implicit measures are unreliable, or generally less reliable or useful than explicit measures.  
For one, both the IAT and AMP are internally consistent by the standards used to evaluate explicit 
measures of attitudes (Gawronski et al. 2017).  Internal consistency reflects the correlations between 
items on a scale.  Measures that are internally consistent are thought to be measuring something 
systematic within individuals; ceteris paribus, low test-retest stability combined with adequate internal 
consistency suggests that the variability between individuals’ scores at different times reflects the 
malleability and context-sensitivity of personal characteristics, rather than flaws in the tools to measure 
them (Payne et al. 2017; see also Brownstein 2016; Brownstein and Madva 2012; Gawronski and 
Cesario 2013).14 The natural analogies here are to measures of heart rate and blood pressure, which 
fluctuate dramatically across contexts (because the measures are accurately tracking that heart rate and 
blood pressure themselves fluctuate dramatically), but are also used to measure more chronic, trait-
like features of individuals.  Of course, using these tools to measure chronic constructs requires, 
among other things, doing as much as possible to hold fixed the contexts of measurement.  Hence 
the phrase ‘resting heart rate.’  Strictly speaking, a one-time measurement of heart rate is capturing a 
fleeting event, but, with careful attention to context, it can be used to gather (partial, defeasible) 
evidence about more stable heart-rate dispositions. 
Similarly, research suggests that people show temporally stable individual differences on 
implicit measures when there are meaningful contextual constraints and these constraints are held 
constant over time for all participants.  In the absence of such constraints, scores on implicit measures 
are significantly shaped by incidental contextual factors which may differ from person to person, as 
well as over time, thereby producing low test-retest correlations. Gschwendner and colleagues (2008) 
offer an example that illustrates this insight.  They assessed German participants’ implicit evaluations 
of German versus Turkish faces on an IAT and varied the background context during each block of 
the text (i.e., they manipulated the blank space on the computer screen immediately below the target 
images and attribute words).  Participants in the experimental condition saw a picture of a mosque, 
which is a conceptually meaningful context for evaluations of Muslims, while participants in the 
control condition saw a picture of a garden, which is conceptually irrelevant for evaluations of 
Muslims.  Gschwendner and colleagues then compared stability of participant scores over a two-week 
period.  Whereas participants in the control condition showed a relatively low stability coefficient of 
.29, participants in the experimental condition showed a relatively high stability coefficient of .72.  This 
latter correlation is notably similar to Gawronski and colleagues’ overall finding for stability of explicit 
measures (r = .75).  This is only one study, of course, and thus needs to be replicated and expanded 
upon.  But it is suggestive that implicit measures are not unavoidably unstable.  Rather, the conditions 
under which they are, and are not, stable must be better understood.   
It bears emphasizing that research along these lines predates psychology’s replication crisis’ 
and the competing meta-analyses of implicit measures.  These studies were not driven by post hoc 
attempts to ‘rescue’ a dying research paradigm, but by a combination of empirical evidence and a priori 
and theory-based considerations about the relevance of contextual cues to patterns of concept 
accessibility and activation.  Note, moreover, that Gschwendner and colleagues have effectively taken 
general hypotheses about the relevance of context and built these insights into the measures themselves, 
making the context part of the measure (think again of resting heart rate).  This manipulation makes 
implicit measures less of a volatile, Rorschach-like indicator of the transient thoughts and activation 
patterns that happen to spontaneously cross an individual’s mind at a given time, and more of an 
indicator of a stable, trait-like disposition (that is, the disposition to respond with certain thoughts, 
feelings, and behavioral impulses in a certain range of contexts). (See also discussion in §5.2 of Mischel 
& Shoda’s (1995) comparable insights regarding personality research.)  
 There is additional suggestive evidence for relevant moderators of test-retest correlations 
elsewhere.  Cooley and Payne (2017), for example, show significantly increased temporal stability in 
AMP scores when images of target groups, rather than images of target individuals, are used.  
Moreover, there appear to be important differences in the temporal stability of implicit associations 
with different contents.  Gawronski and colleagues’ finding of r = .54 is an average correlation across 
all the implicit measures they considered.  For implicit political attitudes, however, they found a 
stability coefficient of .64 (when using an AMP to consider participants’ relative implicit preferences 
for Trump or Clinton).  The stability of participants’ implicit racial attitudes on an AMP were decidedly 
lower—r = .38.  An analogous situation is found in explicit attitude measures; the temporal stability 
of explicit political attitudes is significantly higher than the temporal stability of explicit racial attitudes.  
We note that conclusions drawn from these comparisons must be tentative, given the differences 
between measures that are not being held constant (e.g., stimulus materials).  But we take these results 
to be suggestive.    
 We have described three factors that may affect the test-retest stability of implicit measures: 
the salience of relevant context cues; the type of images used as targets; and the content of the attitudes 
being measured.  The broader lesson here is that there may be meaningful and temporally stable 
differences between individuals when there are meaningful contextual constraints. In the absence of 
such constraints, what is on a person’s mind is influenced by incidental contexts, and in ways that vary 
between individuals and over time.  Theoretical frameworks, such as the Associate-Propositional 
Evaluation (APE) Model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen 2006, 2011), the Situated Inference Model 
(Loersch and Payne 2011), and the Resource Computation Model (Cesario and Jonas 2014), aim to 
predict these patterns.  Our goal is not to defend any particular theoretical model, but rather to point 
to the data that any model must explain.  The mere fact of low test-retest stability in implicit measures, 
considered in independence of any of these data and the theories that predict them, is not sufficient 
to cast implicit bias research wholesale into doubt.  Our hope is that continued research in the vein of 
Gschwendner et al. and Cooley and Payne, which has already indicated promising avenues for 
increasing the stability of implicit measures over time, may contribute to the ability of these measures 
to capture more trait-like than state-like characteristics of individuals.  
 
5. Additional Worries 
 
5.1 Hype 
The hype surrounding research on implicit bias is a cause for concern, because the lofty presentation 
of implicit measures in public discussion sometimes goes far beyond (and sometimes conflict with) 
the empirical evidence.  Researchers themselves are, in some cases, guilty of this, although the most 
egregious cases are found in the popular press15, diversity consulting firms16, and the websites of 
academic departments.17  Such mischaracterizations can lead to serious problems: the misuse of money 
intended to combat discrimination, the creation of misguided public policy, and popular 
misunderstanding of the workings of science.  Overhype can also contribute to cultural skepticism 
about scientific knowledge and expertise, for example, when initially well-publicized results do not 
survive replication, and it can feed back into research itself, in the sense that scholars may be 
incentivized to advertise flashy findings before they are sufficiently well-supported.  Researchers 
seeking to understand the social epistemology of science ought to consider implicit bias as a case study 
of the problems associated with hype at the nexus of social science, philosophy, and science 
communication. 
 Ultimately, however, there are two issues here, not one.  Our focus is on the scientific standing 
of research on implicit bias.  The problems associated with overhyping this research may have 
problematic social effects, and may also reciprocally cause problems for what researchers choose to 
investigate and so on, but this no more means the two issues are one than the Pope’s excommunication 
of Galileo, which surely negatively affected astronomy, meant anything for the truth or falsity of 
heliocentrism.  Critics should not impugn the research itself by pointing to the ways in which 
journalists, corporations, politicians, and some researchers have misunderstood it, any more than they 
should impugn climate science on the grounds that only 48% of Americans believe that global climate 
change is caused by human activity,18 or impugn the theory (‘just a theory!’) of evolution on the 
grounds that only 19% of Americans believe that ‘human beings developed over millions of years, but 
God had no part in this process.’19  Such examples should make salient the many serious challenges 
facing contemporary science communication and education, and perhaps implicit bias researchers 
could benefit from more explicit training on this front.20   
 There are some easy fixes, in our view, to improve the popular understanding of implicit bias.  
For example, Greenwald and colleagues (2015) caution against using the IAT as a diagnostic tool for 
classifying kinds of people (e.g., as ‘implicit racists’).  We agree.  This does not mean that the IAT is 
not a legitimate measure of meaningful differences between individuals or between participants 
assigned to different experimental conditions (see discussion in §5.2); individual differences are not 
typologies, and racism is a hugely complex and loaded label.  For this reason, it may be that the format 
of the feedback given on Project Implicit ought to be revised. At present, test-takers of the race-IAT 
are told that their scores indicate ‘slight,’ ‘moderate,’ or ‘strong’ bias.  One could take this to mean 
that they are slight, moderate, or strong ‘implicit racists.’ But no single instance of measurement, using 
one tool, can determine how biased a person is tout court. 
 Finally, it must be recognized that there remain genuine, ongoing disagreements among those 
who take these measures seriously, about the nature of the underlying psychological constructs, the 
best ways to measure them, and so on.  Are the attitudes measured by the IAT consciously accessible?  
Are they propositionally structured?  Researchers disagree, but they may gloss over these debates while 
trying to communicate novel findings that are not directly related to these questions.21  In any case, 
these communicative shortcomings are a stand-alone issue—which is hardly unique to implicit bias— 
and ought not be confused with the scientific legitimacy of the research itself.    
 
5.2 Situationism  
Payne and colleagues call for a shift away from the individual-differences approach to understanding 
implicit bias, toward an approach that prioritizes situational contexts.  This is a welcome advance.  In 
short, their ‘bias of crowds’ model treats these instruments more as measures of situations than of 
persons.  This model is meant to explain five common findings: (1) average group-level scores of 
implicit bias are very robust and stable; (2) children’s average scores of implicit measures are nearly 
identical to adults’ average scores, suggesting little aggregate change over time; (3) aggregate levels of 
implicit bias at the population level (e.g., regions, states, and countries) are both highly stable and 
strongly associated with discriminatory outcomes and group-based disparities; yet, as we discussed in 
§§2-4, (4) individual differences in implicit bias have small-to-medium zero-order correlations with 
discriminatory behavior; and (5) individual test-retest reliability is low over weeks and months.  
Regarding (3), for example, Payne and colleagues used Project Implicit data to analyze average levels 
of implicit racial bias for each of the U.S. states, finding that, from one year to the next, the test-retest 
stability is quite high (r = .76), and remains so even over a ten-year span (r = .69).  Moreover, a slew 
of recent studies have found that these regional average scores correlate with real-world outcomes.  
Even after adjusting for variables such as explicit bias, residential segregation, and local levels of 
violent crime and unemployment, Hehman and colleagues (2017) find that greater racial disparities in 
police shootings in metropolitan regions of the USA are associated with higher levels of implicit racial 
bias in those regions (β = 0.39).  Findings like this—and there are numerous others (e.g., Leitner et al. 
2016, 2018; Marini et al. 2013; Orchard & Price 2017; Rae et al. 2015)—underscore the need for 
careful study of the relations between implicit bias and social situations and structures.22       
But how could implicit measures be so powerful at the group level, as in (1)-(3), while so 
volatile at the individual level, as in (4) and (5)?  The bias of crowds model accounts for the stark 
differences between individual- and group-level data by appealing to the ‘accessibility’ of social 
concepts in individuals’ minds, that is, the ‘likelihood that a thought, evaluation, stereotype, trait, or 
other piece of information’ becomes activated and poised to influence behavior.  Payne and colleagues 
argue that concept accessibility varies primarily and dramatically as a function of the situation the 
individual is in.  By analogy, one might predict, for example, that the color green will not generally 
make thoughts of beer highly accessible, except around St. Patrick’s Day.  Most research on implicit 
intergroup bias over the past two decades has focused on the differences between individuals in concept 
accessibility (e.g., by contrasting the behavior of individuals who do versus do not automatically 
associate ‘Black’ with ‘weapon’), but Payne and colleagues propose that researchers focus anew on the 
situational causes of concept activation (e.g., contrasting the situations that do versus do not activate 
Black-weapon associations).  ‘Although concept accessibility can, in principle, vary both chronically 
and situationally, there is little empirical evidence for chronic accessibility that gives rise to stable 
individual differences in implicit intergroup bias’ (236), they write.  ‘Instead, most of the systematic 
variance in implicit biases appears to operate at the level of situations’ (236). 
 As we emphasized above, we embrace the call for a renewed emphasis on situational 
moderators of the accessibility of the concepts underlying implicit bias.  Recognizing this does not 
signal the death of the individual differences approach, however.23  In seeing why, a comparison to 
research in personality psychology is instructive.  Despite the binary uptake in recent philosophical 
discussion, which pits ‘persons’ vs. ‘situations’ (e.g., Harman 1999), it is a defining assumption of 
foundational theories that personality only emerges in interaction with situational variables (e.g., Bandura 
1978; Lewin 1936; Mischel & Shoda 1995; see Cervone et al. (2001) for discussion).  In the most 
general sense, the interactionist view states that personality consists of differences between how 
individuals react to situations, rather than general, context-free individual differences (Fleeson 2004; 
see also Doris’ (2002) account of ‘local traits’).  Evidence for this view is that personality variables 
(e.g., ‘extroversion’) are weak predictors of how people will behave in any one given situation but are 
strongly correlated with behavioral trends over time (Fleeson 2004).  This is strikingly similar to the 
evidence Payne and colleagues marshal in favor of their bias of crowds model; implicit measures are 
weak predictors of how people will behave in any one given situation, but are strongly associated with 
aggregated data.24   
 What the person versus situation debate obscures, in both personality research and implicit bias 
research, is that predictions ought to be derived primarily from theoretical models of person-by-
situation interactions.  In their reply to critics, Payne and colleagues posit concept accessibility as the 
mechanism linking systemic (i.e., situation-based) biases to cognitive processes.  Theoretical 
predictions of concept accessibility via person-by-situation activation are many.  Samayoa and Fazio 
(2017) point to attitude strength, for example.  Stronger attitudes are associated with more powerful 
person-based effects; weaker attitudes are associated with more powerful situation-based effects.  
Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006, 2011) point toward many more, most notably the way in which 
the same stimulus can activate different concepts for individuals, given the structure and strength of 
their mental associations.  While Payne and colleagues disagree with these researchers over the 
comparative emphasis that should be placed on situational vs. personal effects, all involved accept a 
view of implicit bias in terms of person-by-situation interactions, and none assert that research on 
individual differences is dead. 
 Much of these differences in approach can also be understood in terms of differing explananda 
(Kurdi & Banaji 2017).  Population-level research, like Hehman and colleagues’, treats individual 
differences and short-term temporal instability in measurements as error.  Here the object of study is 
the aggregate itself.25  In contrast, traditional implicit bias research treats individual differences and 
short-term changes as the objects of study and treats peripheral situational variables as noise.  Person-
by-situation interactions are a third object of study.  For example, Cesario et al. (2010) studied 
personality-by-implicit-bias-by-situation interactions.  They found that, among participants who 
automatically associated ‘black’ with ‘danger,’ ‘black’ activated flight-related concepts in the context 
of an open field, and fight-related concepts in the context of an enclosed booth.  Moreover, they 
found that while implicitly biased participants with non-confrontational personalities tended to sit 
farther away from a black interlocutor (i.e., avoiding potential confrontations with a member of a 
perceived-dangerous group), implicitly biased participants with confrontational personalities tended 
to sit closer.   
Of course, when statistical analyses become complex in these ways, there are familiar risks 
associated with generating hypotheses after the results are known (‘HARKing’) and with mining the 
data until a particular effect reaches statistical significance (‘p-hacking’).  But the same precautionary 
steps and best practices that are widely recommended to avoid these missteps are straightforwardly 
applicable in implicit bias research as well (e.g., preregister studies, specify the number of participants 
in advance based on power estimates, introduce more stringent tests of statistical significance, etc.), 
and ought to be applied to implicit bias research.  Implicit bias research is neither more nor less 
vulnerable to problems like p-hacking than are other fields of empirical study (within psychology and 
beyond), and we offer no novel solutions to address these problems here (but see, e.g., Loersch and 
Payne 2011 and Cesario and Jonas 2014 for discussions of how contextual moderators like those we 
discuss here should inform replication research). 
 Finally, we note the connection between these issues and calls within philosophy and the social 
sciences for greater attention to the structural causes of inequalities and discrimination.  Several 
theorists have been critical of implicit bias research for its putatively individualistic focus (Banks and 
Ford 2008, Dixon et al. 2012, Haslanger 2015), and we are sympathetic with the general point that the 
field has focused on the contents of participants’ minds to the exclusion of contexts, norms, and social 
structures.  However, the findings assembled by Payne and colleagues suggest that there is nothing 
inherently individualistic in the measures themselves.  To the contrary, aggregate IAT scores evidently 
represent an alternative strategy for assessing systemic and structural discrimination.  Several other 
studies have used variants of the IAT to detect implicit perceptions of social norms and regularities 
(Yoshida et al. 2012; Peach, Yoshida, and Zanna 2011; Peach et al. 2011; Walton et al. 2015; cf. 
Brownstein and Madva 2012) and we support these directions for future research.     
 
5.3 Correlations between Implicit Measures 
Some critics have argued that low correlations between different implicit measures are a cause 
for concern (e.g., Machery 2016, 2017a,b).  If a set of measures are valid representations of the same 
construct, then they should, ceteris paribus, correlate with one another.  Our view is that (a) some 
measures are simply more reliable than others, at least for certain purposes, and (b) none of these 
measures is ‘process-pure,’ which is to say that different measures ‘tap into’ different processes in 
theoretically expected ways.26  Neither of these points undermines research on implicit bias. 
Several reviews have found that not all implicit measures are equally reliable (Bar-Anan and 
Nosek 2014; Gawronski and De Houwer, 2014; Payne and Lundberg 2014).  In general, the IAT and 
the AMP tend to do best in terms of their internal consistencies.  If this is so, then one should not 
expect a reliable measure to correlate with measures with weaker psychometric properties.  Now, it is 
the case that even well-validated measures—variations of the IAT and the AMP—don’t always 
strongly correlate.  One explanation for this is that correlations may vary as a function of the content 
of what is being measured (e.g., self-esteem, race, or political evaluations), with the weakest 
correlations found when the most complex concepts are targeted.  Moreover, it is difficult to control 
for differences in content.  Consider an AMP targeting attitudes toward homosexuality and an IAT 
targeting associations between homosexuality and competence.  It is not clear that the affective 
feelings elicited by pictures of (for example) gay men kissing represents the same concepts as those 
elicited by the presentation of pairings of words associated with gay men and words associated with 
competence.  
This example leads to our second point.  Even if the target attitudes are controlled across 
measures, it is well established that each of these measures is influenced by a range of automatic and 
controlled processes, such that different measures capture different components of individual 
performance, including motivation and self-regulatory capacity, in addition to ‘pure’ concept 
accessibility.27  For example, the IAT measures implicit bias in terms of participants’ relative speed or 
accuracy in categorizing pairings of concepts, whereas the AMP measures neither speed nor accuracy, 
and instead treats bias in terms of participants’ intentional judgments (misattributions) about the 
pleasantness of stimuli (for a discussion, see Gawronski & De Houwer, 2014).  Given the AMP’s 
slower pace and reliance on untimed deliberate judgments, we find unsurprising the recent evidence 
suggesting that the AMP is more closely related to explicit measures than it is to other implicit 
measures (Bar-Anan and Nosek 2014; Bar-Anan and Vianello 2018; cf. Payne and Lundberg 2014).  
Ultimately, the relatively low correlations between implicit measures is not so much an anomaly that 
threatens the field as it is a pedestrian empirical finding, which has begun to be explored (e.g., Bar-
Anan and Nosek 2016; Moran et al. 2017).  We would certainly welcome further theory-based and 
experimental investigation into the mechanisms explaining performance on these distinct measures 
(cf. Bishara and Payne 2009; Conrey et al. 2005; Payne et al. 2010), which should illuminate when and 
why they come apart, and, in turn, which specific measures are most apt for which specific aims, 
contexts, psychological processes, and behavioral predictions.   
 
6. Future Directions 
There is significant room to improve implicit measures.  Here we briefly note some areas of 
promise. 
In response to criticism, IAT researchers in particular have often pointed to an ‘accumulation’ 
model of discrimination and social disparities (e.g., Greenwald et al. 2015).28  For example, Greenwald 
and colleagues (2015) identify two conditions under which a tool that measures statistically small 
effects can track behavioral patterns with large social significance.  One is when the effects apply to 
many people and the other is when the effects are repeatedly applied to the same person.  Following 
Messick (1995), Greenwald and colleagues refer to this as the ‘consequential validity’ of a measure.  
They provide the following example to show how small effects that apply to many people can be 
significant for predicting discrimination: 
As a hypothetical example, assume that a race IAT measure has been administered to the 
officers in a large city police department, and that this IAT measure is found to correlate with 
a measure of issuing citations more frequently to Black than to White drivers or pedestrians 
(profiling). To estimate the magnitude of variation in profiling explained by that correlation, 
it is necessary to have an estimate of variability in police profiling behavior. The estimate of 
variability used in this analysis came from a published study of profiling in New York City 
(Office of the Attorney General, 1999), which reported that, across 76 precincts, police 
stopped an average of 38.2% (SD=38.4%) more of each precinct’s Black population than of 
its White population. Using [Oswald and colleagues’ (2013)] r = .148 value as the IAT–
profiling correlation generates the expectation that, if all police officers were at 1 SD below 
the IAT mean, the city-wide Black–White difference in stops would be reduced by 9,976 per 
year (5.7% of total number of stops) relative to the situation if all police officers were at 1 SD 
above the mean. Use of [Greenwald and colleagues’ (2009)] larger estimate of r = .236 
increases this estimate to 15,908 (9.1% of city-wide total stops). 
This suggests that a measure with a correlational effect size of .236 (or even .148) has a role to play in 
understanding patterns of discriminatory behavior.  So too is this the lesson when discriminatory 
impact accumulates over time by repeatedly affecting the same person (e.g., in hiring, testing, 
healthcare experiences, and law enforcement).  With repetition, even tiny impact increases the chances 
of significantly undesirable outcomes.  Greenwald and colleagues (2015) draw an analogy to a large 
clinical trial of the effect of aspirin in preventing heart attacks: 
The trial was terminated early because data analysis had revealed an unexpected effect for 
which the correlational effect size was the sub-small value of r = .035. This was ‘a significant 
(P<0.00001) reduction [from 2.16% to 1.27%] in the risk of total myocardial infarction [heart 
attack] among those in the aspirin group’ (Steering Committee of the Physicians' Health Study 
Research Group, 1989). Applying the study’s estimated risk reduction of 44% to the 2010 U.S. 
Census estimate of about 46 million male U.S. residents 50 or older, regular small doses of 
aspirin should prevent approximately 420,000 heart attacks during a 5-year period. 
The effect of taking aspirin on the likelihood of having a heart attack for any particular person is tiny, 
but the sub-small value of the effect was significant enough to terminate data analysis in order to 
advance the research for use in public policy.   
 Our defense of implicit measures has not relied on arguments about accumulation mechanisms 
like these.  While we think these models are promising—particularly in light of recent studies 
correlating population-level IAT data with real-world inequities (e.g., Hehman et al. 2017, discussed 
above)—we recognize that they are only, at present, statistical models.  While this does not mean that 
they are worthless, future research must vindicate this approach using data from implicit measures 
themselves.29 
 In addition to pursuing the model of accumulation mechanisms (Mallon 2017; Lombrozo and 
Mallon 2017), we believe there is significant room for methodological improvement in the 
measurement of individuals’ implicit attitudes.  For example, as we noted above, Kurdi and colleagues 
(2018) find that methodological design drastically affects IAT correlations with criterion measures.  
They recommend the use of the standard IAT (rather than its variants) with high polarity between 
attributes; relative measures of behavior; and strong correspondence between attitudes and criterion 
behavior.  In this vein, Cooley and Payne (2017) find that the AMP showed greater within-individual 
test-retest reliability when it used photos of groups of people rather than isolated individuals.  This 
tweak, which might also benefit the IAT, improves the likelihood that the measure is truly tapping 
into attitudes about groups rather than about idiosyncratic features of particular individuals or photos 
that are not directly related to the construct being measured. 
Madva and Brownstein (2018) have also made specific proposals for improving the IAT by, 
for example, targeting the activation of specific associations in specific contexts with specific 
behavioral outcomes.  For example, Levinson, Smith, and Young (2014) developed a novel IAT that 
found a tendency to associate white faces with words like ‘merit’ and ‘value’ and black faces with 
words like ‘expendable’ and ‘worthless.’  This measure predicted, among other things, that mock jurors 
with stronger ‘white-value/black-worthless’ associations were comparatively more likely to sentence a 
black defendant to death rather than life in prison.  Prima facie, this correlation suggests that the race-
value IAT is tracking, at least to some extent, something like a disposition to devalue black lives. This 
suggestion is supported by the fact that another IAT that measured associations between white and 
black faces and words like ‘lazy’ and ‘unemployed’ did not predict death sentencing.  These measures 
capture different implicit associations and should predict different behavior.  Of course, these are 
stand-alone studies that need to be replicated.  The point is not that these studies necessarily reveal 
the truth.  Rather, the point is that these measures are successful—if their apparent success is 
ultimately vindicated—by targeting specific, contextually relevant associations in theoretically 
informed ways.  In this vein, we call for more theoretical and empirical work on how specific contexts 
activate specific associations and behavior.  
All that said, more tweaks of this kind will only take implicit measures so far.  The mind is 
populated with many different types of attitudes, biases, concepts, and cognitive structures, each of 
which will be better poised to explain distinctive spheres of social judgment and action.  The 
assumption that all social biases will be best measured either by feeling thermometers or by timed 
concept-accessibility tasks like the IAT is empirically and theoretically unwarranted.  Consider, for 
example, research on generics (Leslie et al. 2015), on motivated propositional reasoning due to 
cognitive dissonance and consistency (Gawronski and Strack 2012) and moral and political values (Jost 
2017; Tetlock et al. 2000), on ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics and biases (Gigerenzer 2008; Hewstone, Benn, 
and Wilson 1988; Kahneman 2011; Peer and Gamliel 2013), on the dependency relations in networks 
of concepts (Meyer et al. 2015; del Pinal, Madva, and Reuter 2017; Sloman, Love, and Ahn 1998;), and 
on the tradition of research on ‘schemas’ that preceded the turn to concept accessibility and semantic 
priming in implicit social cognition (see, e.g., Valian 1998 for a review).  All of these psychological 
constructs may be relevant to explaining and predicting contemporary prejudice and discrimination, 
but many of them will elude detection on the sorts of self-report questionnaires and timed implicit 
measures that have come to dominate the field.  All of these constructs will also interact with each 
other, as well as with contextual variables.  For example, one well-established moderator in the 
heuristics and biases literature is mood (Chartrand et al. 2006).  In short, people in good moods rely 
more on ‘fast’ heuristic processes while those in bad moods engage in slower and more deliberate 
cognitive elaboration.  The same pattern evidently applies to implicit biases.  Participants in good 
moods are more likely to make judgments based on their implicit biases, while those in bad moods 
are more likely to make judgments in line with their reported attitudes (Forgas 2011; Holland et al. 
2012).  More research on moderators like these is needed (cf. Madva 2018). 
 
7. Conclusion 
Critics may interpret our arguments as an attempt to draw a rosy picture, suggesting that all is 
well with research on implicit bias. That was not the goal of this article. Our goal was to show that 
extant concerns have very different implications when the criticism is considered in the broader 
context of research on attitudes and implicit measures. To be sure, such a perspective raises important 
questions about a common narrative in the field, according to which implicit biases reflect stable traits 
that cause discriminatory behavior in an unconditional manner. This narrative is difficult to defend in 
light of the empirical evidence. However, this conclusion does not imply that implicit measures are 
useless and should be abandoned. As we explained in this article, implicit measures are better 
understood as reflecting what is on a person’s mind in a given moment, which is shaped by complex 
interactions of person-related and situation-related factors. Incorporating attention to these factors in 
future research promises to improve behavioral prediction, test-retest reliability, and our broader 
understanding of larger-scale social phenomena related to health, discrimination, and inequality.  
Interpreted in this manner, implicit measures are still invaluable tools for understanding the workings 
of the human mind.  
 
 
Michael Brownstein, Department of Philosophy, John Jay College/CUNY 
Alex Madva, Department of Philosophy, Cal Poly Pomona 
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measures of racial attitudes suffer by virtue of being too indirect, for example, by measuring attitudes toward affirmative 
action as a proxy for attitudes toward African Americans.  While these indirect self-report measures may be less likely to 
be influenced by participants’ self-presentation concerns, they may introduce noise by virtue of measuring beliefs and 
attitudes not directly related to race. 
9 We are unaware of any attempts to replicate this study. We are not endorsing its findings but using it to illustrate our 
point. 
10 But see Cameron et al. (2012) and Kurdi et al. (2018) for further analysis of the idea that implicit measures show 
stronger relations with spontaneous behavior and explicit measures show stronger relations with deliberate behavior.  
Our point is not to defend this point about spontaneous vs. deliberate behavior per se, but to illustrate how the 
informational value of meta-analyses depends upon its treatment of key moderators. 
11 Specifically, from MODE model (“Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants;” Fazio 1990), APE model 
(“Associative-Propositional Evaluation;” Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2006), and MCM (“Meta-Cognitive Model;” 
Petty, Briñol, and DeMarree 2007).  
12 Although the implicit measures were partly related to explicit measures (cf. Nosek 2007), there was significant shared 
variance across the implicit measures that (with the partial exception of the AMP) was not shared with the explicit 
measures, which strongly suggests that the distinct implicit measures are, to varying degrees and in perhaps varying ways, 
 
 
tapping into some single “implicit” construct (whether that construct is a process, representation, evaluation, etc.).  See 
also Cunningham et al. (2001) and Schimmack (forthcoming). 
13 We do not mean to suggest that test-retest reliability is a more important psychometric consideration than predictive 
validity in general.  Rather, as we have argued, the low predictive validity of implicit measures is to be expected when 
considered in independence of theoretical expectations; in contrast, the temporal instability of implicit measures is a 
much deeper challenge, because it questions their validity as measures of trait-like constructs and their suitability for 
predicting behavior over time.  
14 Variance on any given measures can be divided into (1) systematic construct variance; (2) systematic measurement 
error; and (3) random error.  Both systematic construct variance and systematic measurement error contribute to internal 
consistency.  Bar-Anan and Vianello (2018) use a multitrait, multimethod approach to, among other things, begin to 
disentangle the roles of (1), (2), and (3) in implicit and explicit measures.  Note, however, that for any given manipulation 
that causes a change on an implicit measure, the effect could be related more to (2) than (1), i.e., changing the score 
without changing the construct of interest (by analogy, think of concerns in education about merely “teaching to the 
test”).   
15 In the New York Times, Nicholas Kristof writes, “It’s sobering to discover that whatever you believe intellectually, 
you’re biased about race, gender, age or disability.”  See < https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/07/opinion/nicholas-
kristof-our-biased-brains.html>.  As we discussed earlier, explicit beliefs about social concepts are, in fact, strong 
moderators of implicit attitudes about those concepts.  
16 In their document “Proven Strategies for Addressing Unconscious Bias in the Workplace,” a company called CDO 
Insights offers the following: “Each one of us has some groups with which we consciously feel uncomfortable, even as 
we castigate others for feeling uncomfortable with our own groups. These conscious patterns of discrimination are 
problematic, but, again, they pale in comparison to the unconscious patterns that impact us every day.” < 
http://www.cookross.com/docs/UnconsciousBias.pdf>.  There is little reason to think, though, that the problems 
associated with explicit bias “pale in comparison” to the problems associated with implicit bias.  See §5.4. 
17 The Diversity and Cultural Competence website of the Johns Hopkins Medical School asserts that, for example, “The 
IAT has demonstrated to be both reliable and valid at detecting an individual’s level of implicit bias.”  See 
<www.hopkinsmedicine.org/odcc/implicit_association_test.html>.  This seems to suggest that the IAT is a valid 




20 Cf. http://www.aldakavlilearningcenter.org/ 
21 These tendencies are even more understandable in the political context of communicating about implicit bias.  When 
journalists or politicians use research on implicit bias to suggest very broadly that we are all implicated in structures of 
injustice, politically- and culturally-motivated critics sometimes make a concerted effort to portray these statements as 
criticisms of the individual character of ordinary Americans, police officers, etc.  
22 See Hehman et al. (2019) for discussion of pertinent psychometric questions about these studies and their novel 
approach to the use of implicit measures.   
23 Payne and colleagues themselves do not advocate an end to the individual-differences approach, although some 
commenters attribute this view to them. 
24 In the case of implicit bias, the data is aggregated between persons, as in Hehman and colleagues’ research.  In the case 
of personality measures, the data is aggregated within persons over time, at least in Fleeson’s influential research. See 
Machery 2017a for discussion.  But see also Rentfrow et al. (2015), for example, for research on between-individual, 
regional differences in personality traits, and see Madva (2016c) for empirical and normative discussion of individual-
level factors and concept accessibility. 
25 A question for future research is how to determine the appropriate aggregate. On the basis of what theoretical 
expectations should researchers identify the town, city, state, or nation as the aggregate?  
26 For example, although measures like the IAT are typically advertised as a pipeline into automatic processes, an 
extensive theoretical and experimental literature demonstrates that performance on these measures is influenced, to 
some extent, by more deliberate, controlled processes, and a variety of data-analytic models and tools have emerged to 
shed light on the comparative contributions of these different types of psychological processes (e.g., Conrey et al., 2005).  
There is also evidence that much of the apparent variance between implicit measures is simply another manifestation of 
the contextual variability of concept accessibility, i.e., the same phenomenon that explains the low test-retest reliability 
within implicit measures. For example, Cunningham and colleagues (2001) found much higher correlations between the 
IAT and the evaluative priming task after controlling for measurement error. 
27 See, for instance, analyses of various implicit measures using multinomial models (e.g., Bishara and Payne 2009; 
Conrey et al. 2005; Payne et al. 2010). 
 
28 See also Valian (1998, 2005) and Sripada’s comment at < http://philosophyofbrains.com/2017/01/17/how-can-we-
measure-implicit-bias-a-brains-blog-roundtable.aspx>.  
29 See critical discussion of this example in Oswald et al. (2015), who argue that inferences about police officers cannot 
be drawn given that the distribution of IAT scores for police officers is unknown.  This strikes us as unpersuasive, given 
that Greenwald and colleagues present the example explicitly as hypothetical and there is little reason to think that police 
officers would demonstrate less anti-black bias on the IAT compared with the average IAT population pool.  (See 
Mekawi & Bresin (2015) for a meta-analysis of related shooter-bias studies.)  Moreover, Greenwald and colleagues’ 
general point about small effect sizes having significant consequences has been made elsewhere, irrespective of the 
details of this particular example.  Rosenthal, for example, (1991; Rosenthal and Rubin, 1982) shows that an r of .32 for a 
cancer treatment, compared to placebo, which accounts for only 10% of variance, translates into a survival rate of 66% 
in the treatment group compared to 34% in the placebo group.  That being said, we note another caveat about the 
“accumulation mechanisms” defense of implicit bias research. Greenwald et al.’s (2015) statistical model is based on the 
assumption of additivity, and there are reasons to assume a multiplicative instead of an additive model. In a 
multiplicative model, “trickle down effects” become less impactful within a causal chain of factors, because the 
probabilities of implicit bias influencing outcomes would have to be multiplied for each step of the causal chain. For 
example, in a causal chain including two mediating variables that may be influenced by implicit bias and one societal 
outcome as a distal variable, the likelihoods for each step would have to be multiplied to assess the impact of implicit 
bias on the outcome. Thus, even if implicit bias explains 20% of variance for each step of the causal chain, it ultimately 
explains only 4% of variance in the societal outcome.  
